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SOCIAL HOST'S LIABILITY: NO MORE "ONE FOR THE
ROAD" IN NEW JERSEY
Kelly v. Gwinnell
96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
LISA M. WAGGONER*
INTRODUCTION
The New Jersey judiciary has devised a new weapon to be utilized in
the war against drunk driving.' That weapon is a new negligence cause
of action that will impose liability in certain circumstances on a social
host for the negligent acts of intoxicated adult guests who leave the
host's home for the highways. Prior to 1984, a New Jersey social host
was subject to liability only when an intoxicated minor guest left the
premises and injured himself or a third party.2 Although the view that a
social host is liable for the negligent acts of an intoxicated minor guest is
a position advanced in several jurisdictions, 3 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey currently stands alone in its imposition of liability for the negli-
gence of an intoxicated adult guest.
The unique factual setting of Kelly v. Gwinnell4 provided an oppor-
tunity for the New Jersey Supreme Court to impose liability where im-
munity had previously existed. The court held that a social host is liable
for injuries suffered by a third party because of the negligent operation of
a motor vehicle by an adult guest if the negligence is caused by the intoxi-
cation. Furthermore, the new rule only applies when a host furnishes a
* B.A., Roosevelt University, 1983; Candidate for J.D., IIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law,
1986.
1. It is indeed a war. For example, in 1982, Congress passed 23 U.S.C. § 408 (1982) inspiring
states to increase their efforts to eliminate drunk driving; $25 million in 1983 and $50 million for
each of the next two years was set aside by the new law as grant money to fund programs aimed at
curbing the drunk driving problem. Quade, War on Drunk Driving: 25,000 Lives at Stake, 68
A.B.A. J. 1551 (1982).
2. Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976). A New Jersey appellate court held
that a social host could be held liable for an intoxicated minor's negligent acts which caused injury to
an innocent third party after the social host had furnished excessive amounts of intoxicating liquor
to the minor, knowing the minor was about to drive on the public highways.
3. Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 264 Cal. App. 2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1968), rev'd
on reh'g, 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha
Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971); Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309
N.E.2d 150 (1974); Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973); Congini v. Porter-
sville Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1983).
4. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
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guest with intoxicating liquor knowing the guest is intoxicated and will
soon drive.
5
Although the New Jersey court decision is contrary to the law of
every other jurisdiction in the nation on this issue,6 this analysis will
demonstrate that the court made a logical extension of common-law neg-
ligence principles applied in previous cases to slightly different fact pat-
terns. The dissent's overemphasis on the need for the judiciary to defer
decision on this issue to the legislature will also be discussed. Finally, the
impact of the court's decision on the lethal combination of driving and
drinking in New Jersey will be examined.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The courts have utilized two different theories to impose liability on
persons supplying alcoholic beverages. 7 One set of courts impose liability
based on their state's Dram Shop Acts. These statutes allow any person
who has been injured by the service or sale of alcohol to recover limited
damages from the seller.8 No showing of negligence is required to re-
cover against the vendor since the statutory theory of recovery is usually
strict liability. 9 Some statutes specifically state that they apply only to
5. 96 N.J. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
6. The appellate division in its opinion of the case at bar pointed out, "Our research has failed
to disclose any jurisdiction in the United States that allows the precise cause of action urged by
appellant." Kelly v. Gwinnell, 190 N.J. Super. 320, 323, 463 A.2d 387, 389 (1983).
7. For a detailed discussion of these theories and the breakdown of the various states' posi-
tions, see Annot., 97 A.L.R. 3rd 528 (1980).
8. See ALA. CODE tit. 6, § 5-71 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1205 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43
§ 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1979-80); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 340.95 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 5-01-06 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 3-11-1,
3-11-2 (1956); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 176.35 (West Supp. 1979-80);
WYo. STAT. § 12-5-502 (1977). The limitations of the statutory liability vary from state to state.
Illinois, for example, allows recovery from a commercial supplier up to $20,000 for loss of support
and $15,000 for injury to person or property. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1983).
9. Dram Shop Acts constitute a form of strict liability, but there are definite requirements
which must be met before the plaintiff is allowed to recover. For example, under some statutes, the
injured party may have to show that the licensee made an illegal sale at the time the cause of action
arose. Other statutes require a showing of some connection between the fact of intoxication and the
injury. McGough, Dram Shop Acts, PROCEEDINGS OF A.B.A. SECTION OF INS. NEGLIGENCE &
COMPENSATION L. 448 (1966-67). In Illinois, to maintain an action to recover damages under the
Dram Shop Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following:
1) He has been injured (or plaintiff's decedent has been killed) by an intoxicated
person;
2) The defendant's sale or furnishing of liquor caused the intoxication of that person;
and,
3) The action was brought within one year of the date the injury or death occurred.
In addition, the recovery under the Dram Shop Act is limited to $20,000 for loss of support and
$15,000 for injury to person or property. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1983).
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commercial suppliers of alcoholic beverages' o while others have been ap-
plied only to commercial suppliers by way of judicial interpretation. I
No jurisdiction presently allows recovery against a social host on a strict
liability theory under a state's Dram Shop Act.
12
The second theory that courts utilize to impose liability for the inju-
ries caused by an intoxicated person is a common-law negligence the-
ory.' 3 Within this category, some courts have held that violation of a
statutory duty not to sell liquor to certain persons' 4 can be used as evi-
dence of negligence which the jury may accept or reject as it
determines. '
5
New Jersy has no Dram Shop Act; a common-law negligence theory
has been employed by the courts there to impose liability on persons fur-
nishing alcoholic beverages.' 6 The New Jersey courts first faced this is-
sue in 1959 in Rappaport v. Nichols,' 7 a case in which an intoxicated
minor left the defendant's tavern and was involved in an accident in
which the plaintiff's husband was killed. Holding that a tavern owner
would be liable where an injury was foreseeable, the New Jersey Supreme
Court declared:
10. For example, the Iowa Dram Shop Act limits recovery to instances involving the sale or
giving of alcohol by licensees or permitees. IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1979-80).
11. For example, Illinois courts have uniformly construed the statute as applying only to com-
mercial suppliers of alcoholic beverages. Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889); Cunning-
ham v. Brown, 22 Ill. 2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153 (1961); Lowe v. Rubin, 98 Ill. App. 3d 496, 424 N.E.2d
710 (1981); Thompson v. Trickle, 114 Ill. App. 3d 930, 449 N.E.2d 910 (1983).
12. See Graham, Liability of the Social Host for Injuries Caused by the Negligent Acts of Intoxi-
cated Guests, 16 WILLAMET-rE L.J. 561 (1980).
13. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486
P.2d 151 (1971). This is a more recent application of negligence principles. Conversely:
At (early) common law, and apart from statute, no redress exists against persons selling,
giving, or furnishing intoxicating liquor. . . whether on the theory that the dispensing of
the liquor constitutes a direct wrong or constitutes actionable negligence . . . this rule is
based on the theory that the proximate cause of the injury is the act of the purchaser in
drinking the liquor and not the act of the vendor in selling it. 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Li-
quors § 430. Accord 45 AM. JUR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 554.
The jurisdictions which impose liability through their Dram Shop Acts still adhere to this view.
Thompson v. Trickle, 114 Ill. App. 3d 930, 931,449 N.E.2d 910, 912 (1983). A discussion of cases
implementing civil liability in other jurisdictions can be found in Keenen, Liquor Law Liability in
California, 14 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 46 (1974).
14. The District of Columbia and all states have promulgated liquor control statutes which
prohibit the sale and distribution of liquor to minors or obviously intoxicated persons. Violation of
such a law is usually a criminal misdemeanor offense. See Graham, Liability of the Social Host for
Injuries Caused by the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 16 WILLAMETTE L.J. 561, 569 (1980).
15. In general, the use of a violation of a statute as evidence of negligence is a minority view.
The majority of courts have held that if a statute is determined to be the standard of conduct to
which the defendant should be held, than an unexcused violation is conclusive on the issue of negli-
gence and the jury must be so instructed by the court. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 200-01 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
16. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 190 N.J. Super. 320, 322-23, 463 A.2d 387, 389 (1983).
17. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
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Where a tavern keeper sells alcoholic beverages to a person who is
visibly intoxicated or to a person he knows or should know from the
circumstances to be a minor, he ought to recognize and foresee the
unreasonable risk of harm to others through action of the intoxicated
person or the minor. 18
In Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc. ,t9 the court confronted the is-
sue of a tavern keeper's liability to an intoxicated customer who fell on
the premises and died. The New Jersey Supreme Court imposed civil
liability on the tavern keeper for damages resulting from his negligent
service of alcoholic beverages to the visibly intoxicated customer. 20 Fur-
ther, the court noted that this liability did not impose an undue burden
because "the tavern keeper may readily protect himself by the exercise of
reasonable care."
2 1
In 1976, the appellate division of the New Jersey judiciary extended
the common-law duty to a social host in limited situations in Linn v.
Rand.22 There, the court held that a social host who serves alcoholic
beverages to an obviously intoxicated minor knowing that the minor will
thereafter drive may be liable for a third party's injuries inflicted because
of the minor's subsequent drunk driving. 23 Other jurisdictions have rec-
ognized this common-law tort action against a social host and have like-
wise limited liability to situations where intoxicants have been served to a
minor, 24 but liability of the social host has stopped there.25 Social host
liability in New Jersey has gone one step further.
18. 31 N.J. 188, 201, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (1959).
19. 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
20. Id. at 592, 218 A.2d at 636.
21. Id. at 594, 218 A.2d at 637.
22. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976). For an interesting discussion that emphasizes the
differences between the licensee and social host as a rationale for upholding social host immunity, see
Note, Social Host Liability for Furnishing Alcohol: A Legal Hangover?, 1979 PAC. L.J. 95 (1979).
23. 140 N.J. Super. at 219, 356 A.2d at 19.
24. Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1983); Burke v. Superior Court, 129
Cal. App. 3d 570, 181 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1980); Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150
(1974); Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973).
25. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that a social host can be liable for the negligent acts
of his intoxicated adult guests, but the decisions have been abrogated or limited by later legislative
action. For example, in Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or.
632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971), the court imposed liability on the social host, but eight years later the
legislature passed a new law requiring a showing that the cause of action was limited to those situa-
tions when the social host gave alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated guest. In Coulter v.
Superior Court of San Mateo, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978), the California
Supreme Court held a social host liable for the foreseeable harm which resulted from the negligent
service of intoxicants to an adult. In 1978, the California legislature insulated the social host from
liability by enacting a statute specifically providing for a cause of action for service of alcohol against
licensees. 1978 CAL. STAT. ch. 930, § 1. For a discussion of the California Supreme Court's deci-
sion upholding the constitutionality of this statute, see Note, The Constitutionality of Civil Nonliabil-
ity of Vendors and Social Hosts Serving Alcohol to Intoxicated Persons: Cory v. Shierloh, 9
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 784 (1982).
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Kelly v. Gwinnell
FACTS OF THE CASE
Marie Kelly, plaintiff, was injured as a result of a head-on collision
between her auto and an auto driven by Donald Gwinnell, defendant.
Immediately prior to the collision, Gwinnell had been a guest at the
home of Joseph Zak. Gwinnell spent an hour or two at the Zak home
during which time, according to his testimony, he had two drinks, each
with one shot of liquor. 26 When Gwinnell left the Zak home, Zak ac-
companied Gwinnell to his car and watched as he drove away. About 25
minutes later, Zak learned that Gwinnell had been involved in a head-on
collision with plaintiff Kelly.2
7
Plaintiff Kelly first filed suit against Gwinnell and his employer, 28
but later amended her complaint to include Mr. and Mrs. Zak as defend-
ants. The Zaks moved for summary judgment based on their contention
that as a matter of law a host is not liable for the negligence of an adult
guest who has become intoxicated while at the host's home. The trial
court granted their motion.29 The appellate division affirmed, 30 holding
that a social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to an adult is not
liable for damages resulting from the latter's intoxication. 3' The appel-
late division based its decision on the status of social host liability in
other jurisdictions as well as in New Jersey. In these prior cases, courts
found a social host liable only when an intoxicated minor had caused the
injuries to a third party. No jurisdiction's current law imposed liability
on a social host for the negligent acts of an intoxicated adult.3
2
REASONING OF THE COURT
The issue decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court was "whether a
social host who enables an adult guest at his home to become drunk is
liable to the victim of an automobile accident caused by the drunken
driving of the guest."' 33 The court answered yes, stating that if a host
26. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219, 1220 (1984).
27. Id.
28. Gwinnell's employer, Paragon Corporation, was included as a defendant because the corpo-
ration was the owner of the vehicle Gwinnell was driving. 96 N.J. 538, 541-42, 476 A.2d 1219, 1220
(1984).
29. Id., 476 A.2d at 1220-21.
30. Although plaintiff's claim against Gwinnell and his employer were not yet decided pursuant
to NEW JERSEY RULE 4:42-2, the trial court, presumably in order to allow an immediate appeal,
entered final judgment in favor of Zak.
31. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 190 N.J. Super. 320, 326, 463 A.2d 387, 390-91 (1983).
32. Id. at 322-23, 463 A.2d at 389.
33. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 540-41, 476 A.2d 1219, 1220 (1984).
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serves liquor to an adult social guest knowing the guest is intoxicated and
will thereafter be driving, then the social host is liable to third parties for
injuries suffered as a result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle
by the adult guest when that negligence is caused by intoxication.
3 4
Indicating its adherence to traditional principles of common-law
negligence35 as a basis for liability, the court began its reasoning by ap-
plying those principles to the instant case. The court pointed out that
Zak continued furnishing drinks to Gwinnell even though he was se-
verely intoxicated and that Zak knew that Gwinnell would later drive.
Therefore, Zak had failed to conform to a standard of ordinary care by
creating an unreasonable risk that Gwinnell would drive while intoxi-
cated and not be able to operate his auto properly. The risk that Gwin-
nell would be unable to drive his car properly was clearly foreseeable, as
was the risk of a resulting injury to a third party traveling the same high-
way as Gwinnell. Because the forseeable result occurred, the only ele-
ment of negligence left to establish was whether the social host had a
duty to prevent the risk.
36
To impose a duty on the social host, the court noted it would have
to make a value judgment based on broad public policy that required an
inquiry into: 1) the relationship of the parties; 2) the nature of the risk;
and 3) the public interest in the proposed solution. Concerning this
three-step inquiry, the court enumerated the following responses to jus-
tify the imposition of a duty on the social host:
In a society where thousands of deaths are caused each year by
drunken drivers, [footnote omitted] where the damage caused by such
deaths is regarded increasingly as intolerable, where liquor licensees
are prohibited from serving intoxicated adults, and where long-stand-
ing criminal sanctions against drunken driving have recently been sig-
nificantly strengthened . . . the imposition of such a duty by the
judiciary seems both fair and fully in accord with the State's policy.
37
34. Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
35. A negligence cause of action is made up of the following traditional elements:
1) A duty, or obligation imposed by the law, requiring the actor to conform to a
definite standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.
2) A failure on the actor's part to conform to the standard required.
3) A reasonably close casual connection between the conduct and the resulting in-
jury. This is what is commonly referred to as "legal cause," or proximate cause.
4) Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another. PROSSER, supra note
15, at 143.
36. 96 N.J. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222. The question of whether a duty exists has always been the
cornerstone of negligence principles.
The question of liability for negligence cannot arise at all until it is established that the man
who has been negligent owed some duty to a person who seeks to make him liable for his
negligence. *** A man is entitled to be as negligent as he pleases toward the whole world if
he owes no duty to them. Lord Esher, in Le Lievre v. Gould, I Q.B. 491, 497 (1893).
37. 96 N.J. at 544-45, 476 A.2d at 1222. In 1982, there were an estimated 25,000 alcohol-
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To further support this expansion of the duty, the court focused on
the evolution of common-law liability imposed by their past decisions on
those who furnish alcoholic beverages. They discussed Rappaport v.
Nichols, 38 in which the court held a licensee liable for a customer's negli-
gent operation of an automobile. In Rappaport, the court first examined
a New Jersey statute prohibiting a licensee's sale of liquor to minors or
visibly intoxicated persons. Inferring a legislative intent to protect mem-
bers of the general public, the court concluded that a licensee owed a
duty to the general public to protect them from any intoxicated custom-
ers who posed a risk on the highways. 39 The next step was Soronen v.
Olde Milford Inn, Inc. ,40 in which a tavern keeper was held liable for the
death of a patron on his premises whom he had served to a point of
extreme intoxication. The Soronen court enlarged the Rappaport rule by
pointing out that the licensee's duty extended to the intoxicated customer
as well as the general public.4 ' Finally, the appellate division expanded
the liability of a social host to include the negligent acts of an intoxicated
minor guest in Linn v. Rand.42 Extending the Rappaport reasoning to
the facts of its case, the Linn court found the negligent social hosts liable
because: "It makes little sense to say that the licensee in Rappaport is
under a duty to exercise care, but give immunity to a social host who
may be guilty of the same wrongful conduct merely because he is
unlicensed."
43
After noting with approval the Linn court's enlargement of liability
to include the imposition of a duty on a social host for the acts of intoxi-
cated minors, the Kelly court found the same duty of care should be
imposed on the social host in the instant case because it is simply a "duty
of care that accompanies control of the liquor supply." 44 In defining this
duty the Kelly court stated, "the provider has a duty to the public not to
create forseeable, unreasonable risks by this activity.
'45
involved fatalities. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation, Alcohol in Fatal Accidents for Various Driver Age Groups, 1984.
38. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
39. Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8. Even as early as 1959, the Rappaport court recognized drunk
driving was an issue:
When alcoholic beverages are sold by a tavern keeper to a minor or to an intoxicated
person, the unreasonable risk of harm not only to the minor or the intoxicated person but
also to members of the traveling public may readily be recognized and foreseen; this is
particularly evident in current times when traveling by car to and from the tavern is so
commonplace and accidents resulting from drinking are so frequent. Id.
40. 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
41. Id. at 587, 218 A.2d at 633.
42. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976).
43. Id. at 217, 356 A.2d at 18.
44. 96 N.J. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
45. Id.
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Beyond this purely legal support for its decision, the Kelly court
expounded that the balancing of policy considerations on this issue also
led to the conclusion that liability was correctly imposed upon the social
host. The Kelly court emphasized that the overall societal concern
4 6
with the tragic effects that drunk drivers have caused on our highways
outweighed any potential inference with traditional standards of social
behavior that might arise due to the court's decision.
In response to Judge Garibaldi's dissent that this liability is imposed
on social hosts without any attention by the court to the effect it may
have on the average citizen,4 7 the majority replied that in the case at bar,
the responsibility had been properly placed. The burden on the host to
avoid the injury was not an undue burden. The social host also typically
would have homeowner's insurance to protect the loss of his personal
assets if recovery was allowed.
48
Finally, the court faced the dominant contention of the dissent, a
view shared by many other jurisdictions that have faced this issue, that
the extension of liability is one uniquely within the purview of legislative
determination.4 9 The Kelly majority had a simple answer for the dissent:
in New Jersey, the judiciary had historically been the sole lawmaking
body on issues of the existence and scope of duty in negligence cases.50
In addition, the courts' past decisions in this area had not been abrogated
by any legislative enactments, signalling an affirmance by the legislature
of the courts' past decisions.5 The majority noted that the dissent's ar-
gument that the legislature was in a better position to collect and ex-
46. In the past two years, citizen groups such as Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD) and
Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID) have founded chapters in more than 25 states. Quade, War on
Drunk Driving: 25,000 Lives at Stake, 68 A.B.A. J. 1551 (1982).
47. 96 N.J. at 560, 476 A.2d at 1230.
48. Id. at 550, 476 A.2d at 1225.
49. The dissent lists the jurisdictions that have left this issue to legislative determination as
follows: Kowal v. Horher, 181 Conn. 355, 436 A.2d 1 (1980); Miller v. Moran, 96 I1. App. 3d 596,
421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981); Behnke v. Pierson, 21 Mich. App. 219, 175 N.W.2d 303 (1970); Cole v.
City of Spring Lake Park, 315 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1982); Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d
145 (1979); Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969); Schirmer v. Yost,
60 A.D. 2d 789, 400 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1977); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548
(1975), af'd, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976); Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507 (Pa. 1983);
Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969). Ironically, the dissent
approved of the appellate division's decision in Linn, in which the court held that there was no
sound reason to impose liability on a licensee and not a social host. That case was, in effect, a
judicial determination on an issue the dissent felt should be left to the legislature. 96 N.J. at 561, 476
A.2d at 1231.
50. 96 N.J. at 555, 476 A.2d at 1228.
51. More specifically, the majority emphasized, "In fact, the Legislature's passage of S. 1054,
imposing criminal liability on anyone who purposely or knowingly serves alcoholic beverages to
underage persons, indicates that body's approval of the position taken eight years earlier in Linn."
96 N.J. at 553, 476 A.2d at 1226.
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amine data was true with regard to many current problems. However,
the problem caused by drunk drivers on New Jersey highways5 2 was an
issue the majority considered to be one which required immediate action
in the form of a decision targeted at deterring drinking and driving. In
fact, in light of the stricter drunk driving laws recently enacted by the
legislature,53 the Kelly majority concluded that their decision carried out
an implied legislative mandate.
ANALYSIS
The original common-law argument against imposing liability on
the supplier of alcohol was that the consumption of alcohol was the prox-
imate cause of the injury, not the actual service of the alcohol. This con-
tention has only maintained its integrity in those states which provide an
exclusive remedy through their Dram Shop Acts.54 In the jurisdictions
that recognize a common-law tort action against the supplier,5 5 the fur-
nishing of alcohol may be found to be the proximate cause of an injury,
with the consumption, resulting intoxication, and injury-producing con-
duct being forseeable intervening causes.56 Assuming the supplier owes a
duty of ordinary care to a third party on the highway, he can be liable for
his negligent service of alcohol to his intoxicated guest. As long as the
supplier can reasonably foresee the guest's negligent driving, the guest's
negligence will not be a superceding cause that extinguishes the host's
liability for his negligent service.57 The forseeability issue is not a diffi-
cult hurdle because a person is presumed to know what a reasonable per-
son in the society knows, and a reasonable person could definitely foresee
the possibility of an intoxicated person causing an auto accident.
58
Since New Jersey does not have a Dram Shop Act, the courts have
instead relied upon common-law negligence principles 59 to impose liabil-
ity on a provider of alcohol. 60 In Kelly v. Gwinnell,61 all of the elements
52. As evidence of the problem, consider that the total societal cost figure for all alcohol-related
accidents in New Jersey in 1981 alone, including deaths, personal injuries and property damage, was
$1,594,497,898.00. New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles Safety, Service, Integrity. A Report on the
Accomplishments of the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles, 45 (April 1, 1982 through March 31,
1983).
53. There has been a 40% increase in the number of drunk driving arrests in New Jersey since
1980. Id. at 47.
54. See supra note 8.
55. See supra note 13.
56. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 164, 486 P.2d 151, 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 631 (1971).
57. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 204-05, 156 A.2d 1, 10 (1959).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 483, comment b (1965).
59. See supra note 35.
60. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
61. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
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of common-law negligence were present. The furnishing of alcohol to an
obviously intoxicated guest by a host who knows that that guest will
thereafter be driving creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to
those on the highway. 62 The host who furnishes the alcoholic beverages
in such a situation has failed to exercise ordinary care. The danger of
ultimate harm to an innocent pedestrian or driver is clearly foreseeable to
the social host as he observes his guest weaving towards his car knowing
that his intoxication will impair his ability to operate his auto properly. 63
The only element remaining to be established was the scope of the duty
to be imposed on the social host.
Prior to the Kelly decision, the duty to protect the general public
from intoxicated guests had extended to social hosts only in the situation
where the guests were minors.64 In the original 1959 New Jersey deci-
sion, the imposition of common-law liability on a licensee was based on
the rationale that the licensee had a duty to protect the general public
from acts of those customers whom the licensee negligently served past
the point of intoxication. In Linn, the appellate division seized upon this
reasoning to impose a duty on the social host who served alcohol to a
minor guest.65 The same wrongful conduct resulted in injuries to third
persons in both cases. The duty of care to control the liquor supply is a
duty that arose because of the need to protect the members of the general
public from injury. The duty did not arise because the licensee profits
from the service of liquor. Therefore, based upon prior precedent, the
Kelly court properly extended the scope of the social host's duty to in-
clude the protection of the general public from the negligent acts of any
person who consumes liquor on the host's premises.
66
The Kelly court was careful to limit the holding of the case to only
those situations nearly identical to the case at bar. 67 By limiting its hold-
62. Alcohol was involved in 47.5% of the deaths on New Jersey highways from 1978 to 1982.
New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles, Safety, Service, Integrity, A Report on the Accomplishments of
the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles, 45 (April 1, 1982 through March 31, 1983).
63. For an average 180-pound male to register a blood alcohol content of .1 percent, the legal
standard for intoxication, he need only consume five cans of beer within a 90-minute period. Quade,
Beer Packs More of a Punch Than You Think, 68 A.B.A. J. 1553 (1982).
64. Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976). Since this was an appellate court
decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Kelly was actually considering the issue of the scope of
the social host's duty to police all guests' drinking on the host's premises. But the Linn case had
already been relied on in Figuly v. Knoll, 185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (1982) to impose
liability on a social host for furnishing alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person not a minor.
65. Although the Linn holding was limited to the situation where a minor guest had left the
premises and injured a third party, the Kelly court pointed out that the duty imposed on the social
host did not arise from the statute and regulation prohibiting sales of liquor to a minor since those
laws did not apply to a social host. 96 N.J. 538, 546, 476 A.2d 1219, 1223 (1984).
66. Id. at 549, 476 A.2d at 1224.
67. Id. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230.
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ing, the court can avoid the "flood gates" argument of its critics.68 It can
consider whether the facts of each case satisfy the common-law negli-
gence principles as clearly as those in the instant case and evaluate the
circumstances of each case to decide whether there should be liability
imposed on the social host.
The Kelly court, by limiting its holding to the circumstances of the
case at bar, avoided the imposition of overall liability on social hosts for
the acts of any intoxicated guest who leaves his premises. 69 The parame-
ters of the decision do not include a social gathering where a host would
have less ability to gauge and control his guests' consumption of alcohol.
The social host is liable only if he provides intoxicating liquor to a guest
knowing that guest is intoxicated and will soon drive. However, the gen-
eral significance of the holding should have the effect of deterring at least
some social hosts from allowing their guests to drink beyond their
capacity.
Additionally, the possibility of fair compensation for the innocent
third parties will be increased because of the simple addition of another
defendant. Because courts recognize that homeowner's insurance is usu-
ally available to spread the cost of recovery, they favor imposing liability
on a social host rather than the innocent third party. The cost of that
homeowner's insurance may increase as a result of the expanded liability
imposed in cases such as this, but it is customarily spread across the bulk
of policyholders and therefore should not amount to a significant cost for
any one insured. Even though homeowner's insurance may help to avoid
any serious economic repercussions of a lawsuit, such as that in the in-
stant case, the moral repercussions of such a suit should provide an addi-
tional deterrent effect.
70
Both the majority and dissenting opinions addressed the dilemma of
the proper role of the judiciary in the determination of the issue of social
host liability. The Kelly court's expansion of common-law liability can
68. The Kelly court stated confidently "[o]ur ruling today will not cause a deluge of lawsuits or
spawn an abundance of fraudulent and frivolous claims." 96 N.J. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230 (1984).
The reasons given are that the holding is limited to those situations where a host directly serves a
guest and where the liability extends only to injuries caused by a guest's drunk driving. By empha-
sizing these requirements, plus the normal police investigations of accidents, most false claims will be
weeded out.
69. Id. From the limitations explicitly set forth, this decision could not be used to impose
liability on a social host who has not directly served the guest the alcohol which causes his
intoxication.
70. The Kelly court optimistically outlined its opinion on the impact of the decision: "We
believe the rule will make it more likely that hosts will take greater care in serving alcoholic bever-
ages at social gatherings so as to avoid not only the moral responsibility but the economic liability
that would occur if the guest were to injure someone as a result of his drunken driving." 96 N.J.
538, 543, 476 A.2d 1219, 1226 (1984).
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only be viewed as a logical expansion of past decisions. Because New
Jersey had never adopted a Dram Shop Act 7 to define the parameters of
liability for those who furnish alcohol, the judiciary had taken the re-
sponsibility of providing redress to parties injured by negligent, intoxi-
cated drivers. The New Jersey courts first found a licensee could be
liable for injuries caused by the negligent acts of an intoxicated cus-
tomer,7 2 then they imposed liability on the licensee for injuries to the
intoxicated customer himself.73 Next, an appellate court held that a so-
cial host could be liable for the negligent acts of an intoxicated minor
guest who left his premises by automobile and injured an innocent per-
son.74 The courts adjudicated these cases on pure common-law negli-
gence principles. In the 25 year period between the Rappaport decision
and the case at bar, the legislature never acted to abrogate or restrict the
impact of any of the court's decisions. 75 Clearly, if the legislature had
felt that the issue of imposing liability on the suppliers of alcohol was
better suited for legislative determination, it would have taken action by
passing a Dram Shop Act or some other statute on the subject. 76
Although silence and inactivity would not normally be considered indic-
ative of positive approval in the context of judicial and legislative coexis-
tence, 25 years of silence by the legislature is a strong indication to the
judiciary that the legislature agrees with the courts' actions.
Related to the question of the proper role of the judiciary in deter-
mining the liability of a social host as a supplier of alcoholic beverages is
the broader issue of the judicial branch's role as a policymaker on any
issue. As the Kelly court pointed out, the court has decided several im-
portant issues without the benefit of prior legislative examinations. 77 For
example, in Immer v. Risko,78 the New Jersey Supreme Court abolished
interspousal immunity in automobile negligence cases. In France v.
A.P.A. Transport Corp. ,79 the same court held that there would no longer
be parent-child immunity in automobile negligence cases. These deci-
sions were made in the face of strong policy considerations both for and
against the court's position, yet the decisions have been in effect for al-
71. See supra note 8 for a listing of states' statutory Dram Shop Acts.
72. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
73. Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
74. Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976).
75. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 555, 476 A.2d 1219, 1227 (1984).
76. See supra note 25 for a discussion of legislative actions overruling or limiting the imposition
of liability on a social host.
77. 96 N.J. at 547, 476 A.2d at 1219.
78. 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970).
79. 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970).
SOCIAL HOST'S LIABILITY
most 15 years with no legislative alterations.80
No doubt, the ability to investigate certain societal problems in de-
tail and then introduce statutory alternative solutions is an invaluable
function of the legislature. However, the Kelly court properly perceived
that there was no need for investigation into the problem of intoxicated
drivers on New Jersey highways in light of all the information available
on a topic so much in the public eye. The court had the benefit of a
current survey conducted by the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehi-
cles. 8 ' In response to the survey, the legislature had previously enacted
stronger drunk driving laws purported to be "the toughest in the na-
tion."'8 2 A national priority to eliminate drunk drivers on the nation's
highways was acknowledged by the Kelly court as they also had available
a report from the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving.8 3 These
official statistics were supplemented by information provided by the com-
munications media, which reports daily the details of highway accidents
involving drunk drivers. The Kelly court's conclusion that the reduction
of drunken driving84 is a practically unanimously accepted social goal
cannot be disputed. Further, the Kelly court's response to this growing
dilemma properly came in the form of their decision imposing liability on
the social host.
The Kelly court's holding will likely have its greatest impact in juris-
dictions which base the imposition of liability for injuries caused by in-
toxicated persons solely on common-law negligence principles. Beyond
this, the impact of the Kelly decision in jurisdictions having Dram Shop
Acts should be minimal.8 5 Viewed broadly, the very existence of a Dram
Shop Act establishes a substantial argument against any expansion of
liability. Since the legislature has already dealt so specifically with this
subject, any Kelly type of judicial expansion would likely be considered
an intrusion into the legislative domain.
The courts in several dram shop jurisdictions have faced the issue of
social host liability. The courts have been asked to impose liability on
the social host based on alternative theories. First, the social host could
be found liable on the basis of common-law negligence under the assump-
tion that the Dram Shop Act did not apply to a non-licensee and thus did
not preclude common-law recovery. Conversely, liability could be im-
80. 96 N.J. at 557, 476 A.2d at 1229.
81. Id. at 551, n.ll, 476 A.2d at 1226 n.ll.
82. Id. at 545, 476 A.2d at 1222.
83. Id. at n.3.
84. Id. at 545, 476 A.2d at 1222.
85. Currently, sixteen jurisdictions have Dram Shop statutes. See supra note 8.
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posed on the social host by interpreting the Dram Shop Act to include
service of alcohol by non-licensees.
8 6
Several jurisdictions having Dram Shop Acts have faced the issue of
social host liability based on these alternative theories, and have unani-
mously rejected placing liability on social hosts.8 7 The analysis utilized
by the Illinois Supreme Court expressed the dominant rationale of these
courts. The Illinois Supreme Court initially emphasized that the dram
shop cause of action was purely a creature of statute8 8 and that no com-
mon-law tort against a seller of intoxicating liquors existed in Illinois.8 9
Using this foundation, the Illinois courts in 1981 held that no cause of
action existed against a social host who provided liquor to an individual
who later because of his intoxication caused damage to another. 90 Fur-
ther, in that same year, the Illinois courts refused to expand the Dram
Shop Act to apply to social hosts.9 1 As a result, the alternative theories
for recovery against a social host in a dram shop jurisdiction were re-
jected, and the social host was given immunity. In summary, the Kelly
court holding would have no effect in these jurisdictions because the cre-
ation of the statutory cause of action precludes any recovery other than
for those lawsuits brought under the terms of the statute.
CONCLUSION
The Kelly decision represents a significant departure from the for-
merly unanimous view that a social host could not be held liable for the
negligent acts of his intoxicated adult guests. The New Jersey Supreme
Court responded to the local and national problem of drunk driving by
imposing liability on a social host who was a direct, active supplier of
alcohol. By increasing the potential liability of the host, the court hoped
to promote discretion and decrease the probability that a host will en-
86. Two state courts interpreted their state Dram Shop Acts to include the social host as a
defendant. Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972); Williams v. Klemesrud, 197
N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972). Presumably, as in the case of a commercial supplier as defendant, al-
lowing a cause of action under the Dram Shop Act would preclude a suit against the social host
based on common-law negligence principles. However, the state legislatures almost immediately
nullify the courts' decisions to include a social host as a dram shop defendant. Therefore, it is
difficult to predict the outcome of a common-law negligence suit in a jurisdiction that has a Dram
Shop Act that applies to social hosts.
87. See Graham, Liability of the Social Host for Injuries Caused by the Negligent Acts of Intoxi-
cated Guests, 16 WILLIAMETTE L.J. 561, 563 (1980).
88. Cruse v. Aden, 127 Il1. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889).
89. Cunningham v. Brown, 22 Ill. 2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153 (1961); Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill.
311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949); Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889).
90. Lowe v. Rubin, 98 Ill. App. 3d 496, 424 N.E.2d 710 (1981).
91. Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981).
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courage a guest to consume beyond his capacity. 92 Further, since the
Kelly court held that the guest and host are liable as joint tortfeasors,
innocent third parties who are injured as a result of the social host's neg-
ligent furnishing of alcohol will have a better chance of being fairly com-
pensated. 93 Therefore, the plaintiff could sue either one or both the guest
and host and recover a judgment against the single defendant he sued or
both of them. Any right of contribution or indemnification between the
two would require the trial court to consider the effect of the New Jersey
Comparative Negligence Act.94 This decision will likely only be followed
by those jurisdictions without statutory theories of recovery such as
Dram Shop Acts since the holding is grounded upon basic common-law
negligence principles. For this decision to maintain its precedential
value, the subsequent New Jersey courts' decisions must adhere to the
Kelly court's explicit direction of imposing liability only when the facts of
the case are similar to those in Kelly. In the long run, the positive impact
of Kelly could be the revision of the social habits of the average citizen in
New Jersey. In turn this could produce a decrease in the number of
drunk drivers on the highways, making those highways safer for all
citizens.
92. 96 N.J. at 552, 476 A.2d at 1226. See also Stanner, Liability ofa Social Host for OffPrem-
ises Negligence of Inebriate Guests, 68 ILL. B.J. 396 (1980) for a discussion of the importance of these
policy considerations.
93. 96 N.J. 538, 559, 476 A.2d 1219, 1230 (1984). The term refers to two or more persons
jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property. BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 434 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
94. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:15-5.1-5.3 (West 1982).

